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Regional Conflict
Management in Europe
J o h n S. D uffield

This chapter assesses the prospects for the successful management of conflict
in Europe during the next decade and possibly beyond.1It concludes that these
prospects are, on the whole, relatively bright, for two complementary reasons.
First, the potential for militarized conflict in Europe is relatively low in compar
ison with other parts of the world and is likely to remain so. Second, the region
possesses substantial institutional capabilities for collective conflict manage
ment (CCM).2 Indeed, Europe is arguably the region where such capabilities are
best developed and most numerous.
To be sure, this forecast is not entirely sunny, and the situation does not al
low for complacency. In the first place, the potential for violent conflict in Eu
rope, although relatively small, is very real. In particular, serious political con
flicts continue to smolder in Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
(FSU). Nevertheless, more and more of the continent is being steadily trans
formed into a “zone of peace” in which armed hostilities on any significant scale
are highly unlikely and, increasingly, even unimaginable.3 Consequently, much
of the conflict management activity in the region will take the form of amelio
rating and even resolving remaining nonviolent intrastate and interstate differ
ences, and such efforts will be greatly abetted by the processes associated with
the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Eu
ropean Union (EU).
A second caveat follows from the fact that the capabilities for CCM are lodged
in several international organizations, the most important of which are the Or
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and the
EU/Western European Union (WEU) nexus. This fragmentation of capabilities
complicates the task of CCM whenever the coordination of two or more organi
zations is required. Thus at least as important as developing further institutional
capacity is the task of improving the mechanisms for coordinating the activities
239
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of the various extant organizations. Nevertheless, the lack of centralization also
results in a certain degree of institutional depth that allows decision makers
greater flexibility and a wider range of options for conflict management.
The chapter is organized in four sections. The first section specifies the gen
eral tasks of conflict management. The second identifies the most likely re
gional sources of conflict during the next decade. A third section describes the
existing institutional capabilities for CCM in the region. A conclusion assesses
the adequacy of those capabilities in view of the nature and magnitude of the
challenge, emphasizing the role that regional organizations can play in defus
ing remaining conflicts by promoting the internal transformation of states into
stable democracies marked by the rule of law and respect for human rights.

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
In order to assess the prospects for successful conflict management, one must
first identify the types of conflict that are possible and the forms of conflict man
agement that are necessary and appropriate for addressing them.
This chapter takes a broad view of the types of conflict that might be the ob
ject of conflict management efforts in Europe. Relevant conflicts may be either
intrastate or interstate in nature, although the former have dominated regional
conflict managements activities since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, both
domestic and international conflict may assume a variety of forms. At the core
of any situation that might prompt efforts at conflict management, however, is
a political conflict. Political conflicts can occur between two or more groups
over any objects, tangible or intangible, to which those groups may assign
value, such as geographical territory, economic and financial resources, politi
cal standing, identity, religious expression, and so on.
Frequently, political conflicts are dealt with by the groups involved through
nonviolent means. Indeed, the essential purpose of many political structures
and processes, both domestically and internationally, is the expression and rec
onciliation of political differences. Where such political institutions are absent,
weak, or lack legitimacy, or where the nature of the political conflict is espe
cially acute, however, the potential exists for the conflict to become violent.
One side may choose to resort to the use of armed force to achieve its goals, or
an event may occur that may convince one side that it has been—or will soon
be—the target of an armed attack and must react accordingly.
Consequently, the focus of this analysis is situations of political conflict in
which the potential for physical violence is high, if not yet realized. Such con
flicts may remain peaceful yet potentially violent, they may be ameliorated to
the point where the potential for violence is low or nonexistent, or they may in
tensify to the point where violence seems imminent, or what I shall term a “cri
sis situation.” Once a crisis situation is reached, two outcomes are most likely:
either a de-escalation of the crisis or the eruption of armed conflict. Militarized
political conflict may proceed at various levels of violence and destruction and
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for varying lengths of time. Should hostilities cease and the conflict reenter a
nonviolent phase, the principal possibilities are a renewal of hostilities, a con
tinuation of tensions just short of organized violence, or a further reduction of
tension to the point where a more normal situation of political conflict is arrived
at (see figure 8.1).
Using this typology of conflict situations, one can identify a number of po
tential goals and corresponding activities for conflict management. These activ
ities span a wide spectrum ranging from the use of various forms of diplomacy
through the employment of economic instruments to the direct application of
military force (see table 8.1).

Military Conflict

Postmilitary Conflict

Crisis Situation

Political Conflict
1i

'

Nonconflict Situation
Figure 8.1.

Forms of Conflict
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Table 8.1.

Conflict Management Goals and Activities

Stage o f C o n flic t

C o n flic t M a n a g em en t G o a ls

Political C o n flic t (with

E sca latio n Pre ve n tion

s ig n ific a n t potential

A m e lio ra tio n / T e n sio n

fo r a rm e d hostilities)

R e d u c tio n
Settlem ent/R esolu tion

C o n flic t M a n a g em en t A ctivities
E a rly W a r n in g : M o n ito rin g ,
O b s e r v a t io n
P re ve ntive D ip lo m a c y :
N e g o tia tio n , M e d ia tio n ,
A rb itratio n, C o n c ilia t io n
A d ju d ic a t io n
M a te ria l A ss is ta n c e
CSBM s

C risis: A c u te
Political C o n flic t

C ris is M a n a g e m e n t

P re ve ntive D ip lo m a c y

P re ve n tio n o f H o stilitie s

P re ve ntive D e p lo y m e n t

D e -e sca latio n / T e n sio n

C o e r c io n : P o litical a n d

R e d u c tio n

E c o n o m ic Sa n c tio n s,
E m b a rg o e s, Thre ats o f Force

M ilit a r y C o n flic t

C o n t a in m e n t

D ip lo m a c y

S u p p re ss io n

C o e r c io n

A lte ra tio n o f Status Q u o

U s e o f Force: S a n c tio n s
E nforcem ent, D ire c t
Inte rve ntio n

P ostm ilitary C o n flic t

E sc a la tio n P re ve n tio n

D ip lo m a c y

Stab iliza tio n /T e n sio n

C o e r c io n

R e d u c tio n
R e h a b i 1itatio n/R econstruction
Se ttlem ent/Resol ution

A r m s C o n t r o l/ C S B M s
M o n it o r in g
P e a c e k e e p in g
M a te ria l A ss is ta n c e
A d m in istra tio n / P o lic in g
Political/Le gal Institution
B u ild in g

In the case of political conflict situations involving a significant potential for
armed violence, the goals of conflict management are to prevent the conflict
from escalating to a crisis situation and becoming militarized and, ideally, to
lower the level of tension if not resolve the conflict altogether. To this end, rel
evant conflict management activities may consist of early warning; preventive
diplomacy, including such approaches to conflict resolution as mediation, arbi
tration, and conciliation; and adjudication. Concerned outside parties might
also employ a range of material and nonmaterial inducements to promote re
straint in the short term and, ultimately, to lay a foundation for more peaceful
relations among the local adversaries.
Should a crisis situation in which military hostilities seem imminent occur, the
goals of conflict management become the prevention of the outbreak of open
violence and the de-escalation of the crisis. Associated activities may consist of
renewed efforts at preventive diplomacy, preventive military deployments, and
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coercive actions involving political and economic sanctions, the imposition of
embargoes, and the threat of force.
In the face of actual armed hostilities, conflict management goals become the
containment of the fighting, its suppression, and, in some cases, bringing about
changes in the status quo on the ground. Relevant conflict management activi
ties may include not only diplomacy and the various forms of coercion de
scribed above but also the actual use of military force for the purpose of en
forcing sanctions and direct intervention.
Finally, once the fighting has come to a halt, the goals of conflict manage
ment shift back to preventing a renewal of hostilities, stabilizing the situation
and further reducing the level of tension, and possibly rehabilitating damaged
areas. At such points, an especially wide range of activities may be appropri
ate. Diplomacy and coercion continue to be relevant. In addition, the estab
lishment of arms control regimes and confidence- and security-building mea
sures (CSBMs) may help to limit the potential for violence and rebuild trust.
Peacekeeping operations can be used to separate warring parties and to mon
itor and ensure their compliance with any cease-fire agreements. And recon
struction efforts may require the provision of various forms of assistance and
even the assumption of administrative and other tasks by third parties.

THE NEED FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT:
REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN EUROPE
The next step in assessing the prospects for successful conflict management in
volves identifying actual and potential regional conflicts. To do this, one must
first establish the boundaries of the region in question. Regions are contested
concepts, and Europe is no exception. To avoid an extended discussion, this
chapter will simply define Europe as consisting of the those territories located
east of the Atlantic Ocean, north of the Mediterranean Sea, and west of the Ural
Mountains and Caspian Sea.4 In addition, the United States and Canada are re
garded as regional actors, if not European states, in view of their long-standing
membership in postwar European security organizations.
Within this area, one finds that a high percentage of the actual or potential
military conflicts are located either in the Balkans or on the territory of the for
mer Soviet Union (see table 8.2). The remainder of Europe, especially the terri
tory of those states belonging to NATO or the EU, is virtually free of interstate
and intrastate political conflicts that could acquire a military dimension in the
foreseeable future. This skewed geographical distribution has implications for
actual utility of the institutional capabilities for CCM in the region, as will be dis
cussed below.
In addition, many of the conflicts of relevance to this study, whether inter
nal or international in nature, have a significant ethnic basis. They stem from
the presence within the territory of individual states of two or more distinct
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Conflicts in Europe

Primary Basis o f Conflict

Internal

International

Bosn ia

A lb an ia-Y ugo sla via (Kosovo)

Croatia

A lb a n ia -M a c e d o n ia
B osnia-Yugoslavia

Ethnic
O u tsid e FSU

Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Vojvodina)
M a c e d o n ia
Turkey

C roatia-Yugoslavia
Slove nia-Yugoslavia
H u n ga ry-R o m a n ia
H u n gary-S lo v ak ia
Flun gary-U kraine
Turkey-Bulgaria

W ith in FSU

N on-Ethnic

M o ld o v a

Russia-Estonia

G e o rgia (Abkhazia, Sou th Ossetia)
A zerbaijan

Russia-Latvia

Ru ssia (Chechnya, etc.)

A rm e nia-A zerb aijan

Yugoslavia (M ontenegro)
A lb an ia

Y u g o slav ia-M a ce d o n ia

R u ssia -U k ra in e

M a c e d o n ia -G re e c e
G reece-Turkey

and sizable ethnic groups and the existence of some substantial grievance on
the part of at least one of the groups vis-à-vis the other(s). The precise nature
of the grievance(s) can vary, but as a result of such grievances, ethnic groups
may seek greater political autonomy, outright independence, or unification
with neighboring countries dominated by members of the same nationality.
The following summary description distinguishes between those conflicts
that are located in the FSU and those elsewhere. As Philip Roeder has noted,
“the space previously within the Soviet Union now constitutes a distinct inter
national region.” It also differentiates between those conflicts that have a sig
nificant ethnic basis and those with other underlying causes.5
O utside th e Form er Soviet Union

Outside of the former Soviet Union, the most acute ethnic conflicts tend to be
found on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The recent bloody struggles be
tween Kosovars (of Albanian ethnicity) and Serbs in Serbia, Croats and Serbs in
Croatia, and Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Bosniaks in Bosnia are well known. In
addition, tensions exist between the Hungarian minority and the Serb majority
in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina, while those between the Alban
ian minority (approximately 30 percent of the population) and the Macedonian
majority in Macedonia were exacerbated by the influx of refugees from Kosovo.
Outside of the Balkans, violence has long been a common feature of relations
between Turkey and its Kurdish minority.
Most of these ethnic conflicts also have a significant external dimension. The
treatment of the Albanian minorities in Serbia and Macedonia has been at the
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center of disputes between Albania and those two countries, respectively.6 Dur
ing the early 1990s, forces from Serbia were involved in fighting in both Croa
tia and Bosnia. Hungary has expressed concern about the treatment of ethnic
Hungarians in not only Serbia but also Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Like
wise, Turkey has criticized Bulgaria’s treatment of the Turkish minority (eight
hundred thousand) in that country.7
Not all of the potential domestic and interstate conflicts outside the FSU can
be said to have primarily ethnic foundations, however. In Albania, the potential
for violence has been exacerbated by the lack of strong political institutions and
a weak economy. Montenegro has been rent by a power struggle between
those who would maintain close ties to Serbia and those favoring an opening
to the West. On the international side of the ledger, Greece and Turkey have oc
casionally come close to blows over competing territorial claims in the Aegean,
and tensions have at times been high between Greece and Macedonia because
of feared revanchist designs associated with the disputed appropriation of var
ious cultural symbols.8 Finally, the Bulgarians have never recognized the exis
tence of a distinct Macedonian nationality, raising the specter of at least an im
plicit claim to Macedonian territory.9
Before moving on to consider the situation in the FSU, it is important to note
those once-feared conflicts that have dissipated or that appear to have been ex
aggerated in some accounts. Perhaps most notable in this regard are the im
provements in relations that occurred between united Germany and its immedi
ate eastern neighbors, Poland and the Czech Republic, during the 1990s.
Although not all outstanding issues have been resolved and some bitter feelings
remain, armed conflict between these states is unimaginable today. Likewise,
significant progress has been made toward a resolution of the problems created
by the Hungarian diaspora, especially the Hungarian minority in Romania (Tran
sylvania).10 And even parts of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and increasingly
Croatia, have become remarkably stable over the course of the last decade.
Within the Former Soviet Union
A comparable number of violent and potentially violent political conflicts can
be found on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This state of affairs should
come as no surprise, given that the Soviet Union employed repressive measures
to weld together a plethora of nationalities and afforded them few opportuni
ties for meaningful self-expression or self-determination for more than half a
century, notwithstanding pretenses to the contrary. These conflicts can be
roughly grouped into four subregional categories.
The first concerns relations between Russia and the Baltic states, especially
Estonia and Latvia. Russia has been at odds with its much smaller northwestern
neighbors to varying degrees over borders, military basing rights, and, most im
portantly, the treatment and status of ethnic Russians, who have constituted
roughly 30 percent of the populations of Estonia and Latvia."
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The situation of ethnic Russian minorities has also burdened Russian rela
tions with several other former Soviet republics, most notably Ukraine and
Moldova. In the former, the problems created by the presence of some eleven
million Russians have been compounded by the concentration of many of
them in industrial regions that border Russian territory and Russian claims to
the Crimea, which was transferred by Russia to Ukraine in the 1950s and con
tains a substantial presence of ethnic Russians. In Moldova, the geographically
concentrated Russian minority has even attempted to establish an independent
republic, which has nevertheless failed thus far to garner international recog
nition.12
Most of the violent conflicts on the territory of the FSU have taken place in
the Caucasus region. The territorial integrity of Georgia has been forcibly chal
lenged by armed, ethnically based secessionist movements in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Nearby, Azerbaijan has been engaged in a violent struggle with
separatist ethnic Armenians in the province of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has in
turn strained relations between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia.
Finally, Russia faces severe internal ethnic troubles of its own. The most
prominent of these are also to be found in the Caucasus, where Russia has al
ready waged two expensive wars in Chechnya in less than a decade. Neverthe
less, a real potential for violent, ethnic conflict exists in a number of other parts
of the country as well, such as Tartarstan, where long-suppressed national mi
norities strive for greater autonomy if not outright political independence.13

INCENTIVES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
What incentives might other states in the region possess for seeking to manage
these conflicts? After all, even if potentially violent conflicts exist, those not di
rectly involved will be disinclined to engage in conflict management efforts if
they have no compelling interest to do so, in view of the risks and costs. And
as Richard Ullman convincingly argued a decade ago, the stakes that the more
stable countries of western and central Europe have in other parts of the region
are lower than ever.14
Nevertheless, the incentives for conflict management in Europe are not neg
ligible and, indeed, have been sufficient to prompt numerous efforts at CCM, in
cluding military operations of substantial magnitude, since the end of the Cold
War. The strength of these incentives will vary, however, depending upon the
precise nature and location of the conflict. As Joseph Lepgold has noted, more
over, even where significant incentives exist, states may be inhibited from tak
ing strong action because of the collective action problems associated with
peace operations.15
In the case of conflicts outside the FSU, especially in southeastern Europe,
one important incentive is the danger that a violent conflict, if unaddressed, will
spread to adjoining territories through a process of spillover, the uncoordinated
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intervention of outside parties, or both. A second incentive follows from the be
lief that the illegitimate resort to arms should not go unpunished, as it may oth
erwise encourage disgruntled groups located elsewhere to use violence if they
believe that it promises success and that they can act with impunity. A some
what more self-interested consideration is that large-scale violence can gener
ate equally large-scale outflows of refugees. In the early 1990s, for example,
over eight hundred thousand Bosnians alone sought refuge in other European
states, including more than four hundred thousand in Germany,16 while at the
end of the decade, nearly a quarter million Kosovars fled to neighboring Mace
donia. Nor, as Western governments have learned in Bosnia and Kosovo, do the
material costs stop mounting when the fighting comes to an end. Outside par
ties interested in preventing a renewal of violent conflict may have to consider
making substantial financial contributions to the process of reconstruction over
a prolonged period.
At the same time, one should not discount the significance of purely human
itarian motives to protect the innocent and to minimize the suffering of peoples
affected by conflict. In an age when the various media provide a steady stream
of stories about and images of the consequences of violence, most citizens in
the advanced industrial countries of Europe no longer have the luxury of being
able to remain ignorant of military depredations taking place on their continent.
Thus even where the material stakes have appeared to be low, Western gov
ernments have come under considerable public pressure to do something to
stem the violence.
As a general rule, the incentives that the states of western and central Europe,
not to mention those of North America, have to take action are not as great
when it comes to conflicts within the FSU. The level of humanitarian concern
may be equally high. But because such conflicts are further removed geo
graphically, these states are much less likely to be affected directly or indirectly,
except where a conflict threatens to destabilize Russia or to reverse the hardwon democratic advances that have been made there. Conversely, the costs and
risks of involvement are likely to be higher, especially where it might put them
at odds with Russia.
The risk of serious tensions over conflict management strategies is not negli
gible, given that Russia is itself a party to many of the conflicts in the FSU and
that, even where it is not, Russian incentives for intervention are arguably
broader and potentially inconsistent. Beyond those incentives shared with the
other states in the region, such as preventing spillover effects, they include Rus
sia’s determination to remain a major player in all aspects of European security
affairs, notwithstanding its current economic and political weaknesses. And in
those areas that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, such as the Transcaucasus, Russia’s motives may extend to a desire to retain or reestablish a signifi
cant degree of hegemonic influence.17 Needless to say, such goals may at times
result in Russian actions that run counter to traditional conflict management
prescriptions.18 They also complicate Western calculations of how to proceed,
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given the understandable desire to maintain good working relations with Rus
sia on a range of other important issues.
In sum, both outside and within the FSU, the precise nature and strength of
the incentives to engage in CCM will vary from state to state and from conflict
to conflict, but they will rarely be entirely absent. The more practical question
concerns the point at which they will be sufficiently strong to prompt action. In
particular, will outsiders see fit to intervene early enough or in the most effec
tive manner? The answer to this question depends, in part, on the tools avail
able for CCM, to which I now turn.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR
COLLECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE
With the partial exception of Russia, the principal actors in the region are likely
to engage in conflict management activities only collectively through existing
multilateral security institutions. Europe possesses a set of relatively highly de
veloped institutional capabilities of potential use for CCM. Most of these capa
bilities are lodged in a variety of regional organizations, the most important of
which are the OSCE, NATO, and the EU/WEU. In the discussion that follows, I
shall refer to such bodies as regional conflict management organizations
(RCMO).
Needless to say, given their diverse origins, purposes, and memberships,
these organizations differ considerably in terms of their potential CCM capabil
ities. The OSCE is the only truly pan-regional organization. NATO and the
EU/WEU have restricted memberships but are of potentially great relevance to
CCM efforts beyond the territory of their members. Yet other RCMOs, like the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), are confined in both their mem
bership and activities to particular subregions.
All, however, have evolved considerably during the past decade and will
probably continue to do so. Thus the overall picture is very much a work in
progress. Nevertheless, the situation has probably stabilized enough that it is
possible to provide a description and comparative analysis of these organiza
tional capacities that will not immediately become obsolete. This analysis will
consider each of the following relevant organizational characteristics:
1. membership and, where it may differ, geographical area of responsibility
(see table 8.3)
2. functional mandate
3- decision-making process
4. organizational capabilities and resources (see table 8.4).
With regard to the fourth characteristic, it should be emphasized that the inter
est of this study lies in the assets possessed by the organizations themselves

Table 8.3.

Membership in European Conflict Management Organizations
EU
N ATO

P FP

W EU
Canada

D e n m ark

C IS

O th e r O S C E

B e lg iu m

A u stria

A rm e n ia

A lb a n ia

C z e c h R e p u b lic

Britain

F in la n d

A z e r b a ija n

B u lg a ria

B o s n ia

H u n gary

Fran ce

Ire la n d

B e la ru s

Estonia

C ro a tia

Sw eden

C y p ru s

A n d o r ra

Ic e la n d

G e rm a n y

G e o r g ia

Latvia

N o rw ay

G re e c e

M o ld o v a

L ith u a n ia

H o ly Se e

P o la n d

Italy

R u ssia

M a c e d o n ia

L iechte nstein

T u rk e y

L u x e m b o u rg

U k r a in e

U n ite d States

N e th e rla n d s

R o m a n ia

M a lt a

S lo v a k ia

M onaco

Portugal

S lo v e n ia

S a n M a r in o

S p a in

Sw itz e rla n d

Y u g o sla v ia

Note: This table excludes the five Central Asian republics.

Table 8.4.

Crisis Management Capabilities and Resources by Organization

P o litica l c o n flic t

O SCE

N ATO

E U /W E U

O thers

Satellite C e n te r

U N (p reventive d e p lo ym e n t,

HCNM

PFP

O D IH R

EAPC

C o u r t o f C o n c ilia t io n

Se cre ta ry-G e n e ra l/IS

(e arly w a rn in g )

p re ve ntive d ip lo m a c y )

H u m a n it a r ia n O ffic e
M o n it o r in g m is sio n s

a n d A rb itratio n
M i s s io n s
P e rso n a l re presentatives
CPC
F S C (a rm s con trol, C S B M s )
C r is is situ atio n

CPC

I M S (sa n c tio n s enfo rce m e n t)

M ilit a r y c o n flic t

M i s s i o n s (sa n c tio n s assistan ce )

I M S (sa nctio ns, threats o f

U N (m e d iatio n , sa n c tio n s)
M ilit a r y staff (p e ac e m a k in g )

P o stm ilita ry c o n flic t

M i s s i o n s (B o sn ia ,
C ro a tia , K o so v o )
C P C (p e a c e k e e p in g )
F S C (arm s con trol, C S B M s )

IM S / P F P (p e a c e k e e p in g)

U N (m e d iation , san ctio ns,
m a n d a te to use force)

force, u se o f force)
M ilit a r y staff
(p e a c e k e e p in g)
Satellite C e n te r
(m o n ito rin g, v e rifica tio n )
H u m a n it a r ia n O ffic e
A g e n c y fo r R e c o n stru c tio n
M o n it o r in g m is sio n s

U N (m o nito rin g,
p e a c e k e e p in g ,
a d m in istratio n )
C IS (p e a c e k e e p in g)
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rather than the national resources of their members. Nevertheless, the two may
be closely related insofar as one purpose of the former is to facilitate and en
sure the efficient use of the latter.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE is the most comprehensive, both geographically and functionally,
of the RCMOs in Europe. All states in the region are eligible for membership, and
in fact virtually all European states are members.19 Correspondingly, the OSCE
possesses a standing mandate to address conflicts throughout the region, subject
to decision-making constraints. The OSCE is the only RCMO in Europe that is
considered a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
At the same time, the OSCE has a very broad mandate with regard to conflict
management. Its various decision-making bodies can authorize a wide variety of
measures. These include short-term fact-finding and rapporteur missions, long
term in-country missions that may serve several purposes (sanctions assistance,
monitoring and verification, etc.), personal representatives of the Chairman-inOffice (CiO), and additional measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Furthermore, the OSCE may undertake peacekeeping activities, although this
option has not yet been exercised. Nevertheless, the mandate of the OSCE is ori
ented much more toward the goals of dispute resolution, early warning, escala
tion prevention, and crisis management rather than dealing with actual military
hostilities. In particular, it lacks any explicit authority to call for the employment
of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions and the use of military force,
by its members.20
A further limitation of the OSCE is the cumbersome nature of its decision
making process. In principle, all of its decision-making and negotiating bodies
operate by consensus, which “is understood to mean the absence of any ob
jection expressed by a participating State to the taking of the decision in ques
tion.”21 This requirement might not be so onerous but for the large and diverse
nature of the OSCE membership and the resulting divergence of interests. In ad
dition, decisions of the organization are not legally binding.
Nevertheless, the OSCE has, over the past decade, developed several excep
tions to the consensus rule that enhance its abilities to address conflicts in the
region. Under the “consensus-minus-one” principle, actions can be taken with
out the consent of the state concerned in “cases of clear, gross and uncorrected
violation” of OSCE commitments. This mechanism was used to suspend Yu
goslavia’s membership in 1992. Under the “consensus-minus-two” rule, the
Ministerial Council can instruct two participating states that are involved in a
dispute to seek conciliation, even if the participating states object to the deci
sion, although this option has not yet been made use of. And the Chairman-inOffice may designate personal representatives on his or her own responsibility.
In addition, the OSCE had developed a variety of additional mechanism and
procedures that are intended, in cases requiring rapid action, to facilitate
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prompt and direct contact between the parties involved in a conflict and the
mobilization of concerted action by the OSCE. The “Vienna Mechanism” obliges
states to respond to requests for information relating to human dimension obli
gations and to hold bilateral meetings when requested. The “Moscow Mecha
nism” allows a group of six or more states to initiate the dispatch of a mission
of experts to assist a state in the resolution of a particular question or problem
relating to the human dimension.22 The “Mechanism for Consultation and Co
operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities” obliges states to provide in
formation regarding any unusual and unscheduled activities of their military
forces when requested. And several other mechanisms were rendered super
fluous by the establishment in 1993 of the Permanent Council of national rep
resentatives, which can meet on short notice.
To support its various conflict management activities, the OSCE has developed
a number of distinct capabilities and resources since the end of the Cold War. Per
haps the most important of these is the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), which
is responsible for overall support for the implementation of OSCE tasks in the
fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict
rehabilitation, and for daily follow-up and liaison for the execution of OSCE de
cisions. Since 1999, the CPC has maintained an Operations Centre to identify po
tential crisis areas and to plan for future missions and operations. Nevertheless,
given the small size of the CPC, the OSCE’s ability to prepare and support peace
keeping operations in particular remains highly limited at this point.
Several other structures also merit mention. The High Commissioner on Na
tional Minorities (HCNM) functions as an instrument of preventive diplomacy.
The HCNM aims to identify—and promote the early resolution of—ethnic ten
sions that have the potential to endanger peace, stability, or friendly relations
between the participating states of the OSCE. The Office of Democratic Institu
tions and Human Rights (ODIHR) contributes to early warning and conflict pre
vention, in particular by monitoring the implementation of human dimension
commitments. And states may submit disputes to the OSCE-related Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration, whose final decisions are legally binding, although
not all OSCE states are parties to the convention establishing the Court and the
Court has not yet been used.
Somewhere between a decision-making body and an organizational capabil
ity is the multipurpose Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Its main objec
tives include conducting negotiations on arms control, disarmament, and con
fidence- and security-building and holding regular consultations and intensive
cooperation on matters relating to security. The FSC is also responsible for the
implementation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), the
holding of Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings, the provision of a fo
rum for discussing and clarifying information exchanged under agreed upon
CSBMs, and the preparation of seminars on military doctrine. Among its
achievements have been the negotiation of a CSBM regime for Bosnia and a
subregional arms control agreement for much of the former Yugoslavia.
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
NATO, which dates back to 1949, is the oldest of the European organizations
with significant CCM capabilities. It is also arguably the one whose security
functions have changed the most over the years. In sharp contrast to the OSCE,
NATO began as a traditional alliance with a primary focus on the protection of
its members against external threats. Only in the 1990s did it acquire explicit
conflict management responsibilities. As a result of this rather different life his
tory, many of the areas in which the OSCE is weakest are those in which NATO
is strongest, and vice versa.
Unlike the case of the OSCE, membership in NATO is restricted. The existing
members may chose to invite other states to join the organization, but there are
no explicit criteria for membership. Currently, NATO has nineteen members.23
Nevertheless, NATO involves a number of other states in its activities
through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (which supplanted the North At
lantic Cooperation Council in 1997) and, especially, its Partnership for Peace
(PFP) program. Participation in the PFP is based on agreements negotiated be
tween individual countries and NATO regarding the scope, pace, and level of
joint activities in which they would like to engage. Currently, some twentyseven additional states have established cooperative programs with NATO un
der the PFP.
The North Atlantic Treaty was carefully worded to ensure that members’ ob
ligations to one another did not extend beyond their territories in Europe and
North America (with the exception of attacks on member forces located in the
Mediterranean and North Atlantic). At the same time, however, the Treaty does
not prohibit the members from acting collectively outside this so-called North
Atlantic Area, should they wish to do so. In addition, under the terms of the PFP,
NATO is obliged to consult with any active participant if that state perceives a
direct threat to its security.
One consequence of NATO’s restricted membership is that its decisions do
not automatically command legitimacy in areas outside those covered by the
treaty. As a result, members are typically—but not always, as evidenced in
Kosovo—reluctant to act collectively “out of area” in the absence of an explicit
mandate from the United Nations or the OSCE. In practical terms, this means
that the use of NATO for CCM activities is highly unlikely on the territory of the
former Soviet Union and, especially, in Russia proper.
During the Cold War, NATO’s formal mandate focused on the closely related
tasks of deterring military attacks on its members and defending them should
an attack nevertheless occur. Since the end of the Cold War, this mandate has
been considerably broadened and now includes explicitly the functions of
“conflict prevention and crisis management.” The alliance’s most recent strate
gic concept, adopted in 1999, notes the possibility of conducting “crisis re
sponse operations” such as those that have been carried out in the Balkans and
reiterates NATO’s offer to support “peacekeeping and other operations under
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the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, in
cluding by making available Alliance resources and expertise.”24
Although the strategic concept is less explicit on this point, it also envisages a
variety of activities intended to ameliorate or even resolve political conflicts.
Through the “active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue” with non
members, NATO aims “to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead
to instability and conflict.” This task complements the alliance’s long-standing (at
least since the admission of Germany in 1955), if always implicit, function of de
fusing political conflict among its members by increasing transparency, promot
ing military interdependence, and perpetuating U.S. involvement in European se
curity affairs.25
Like the OSCE, NATO acts on the basis of consensus. This requirement means
that decision making on contentious issues, such as those often associated with
conflict management, can be slow and difficult.
For several reasons, however, consensus is generally easier to attain in
NATO than in the OSCE. Most obviously, the achievement of consensus is fa
cilitated by NATO’s smaller membership. Perhaps even more important is the
fact that, as a general rule, the interests of NATO countries are more closely
aligned with one another than are those of OSCE members, which is a conse
quence of the alliance’s restricted membership. A third factor is the large num
ber of well-exercised bodies and procedures for timely consultation and the
exchange of information. In addition, deliberation within the North Atlantic
Council, the alliance’s highest-level decision-making body, can be expedited
by the presence of a strong secretary-general, who can use his authority to pro
pose and broker compromises in cases where the membership is divided.26 Fi
nally, in some instances, the existence of a dominant member, the United
States, has helped to overcome differences where it has been willing to lead.
NATO’s most distinctive organizational asset for carrying out crisis manage
ment activities is its integrated military planning and command structure and as
sociated multilateral military assets, such as the NATO Airborne Early Warning
Force. When supplemented by PFP-related bodies, especially the Partnership
Coordination Cell, the integrated military structure (IMS) gready facilitates the
collective deployment and use of military forces by NATO members and part
ner countries. Even as it has been considerably streamlined since the end of the
Cold War, this structure has developed the ability to orchestrate out-of-area
multilateral military operations of substantial size and complexity, as evidenced
by the various NATO actions in the Balkans. Consequently, NATO remains the
RCMO best positioned to engage in the enforcement of sanctions, peacekeep
ing, direct intervention, and other types of military operations.
The principal question that has arisen regarding the utility of the IMS con
cerns possible instances in which one or more members might wish not to par
ticipate in a proposed joint military operation outside the NATO area. During
the Cold War, the military structure made no provisions for less than unanimous
engagement in defense operations by participating states, reflecting the near
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water-tight obligation to provide assistance contained in Article 5 of the treaty.
Many now imaginable out-of-area conflict management activities would carry
no such obligation, however. To address this potential problem, the alliance has
developed and begun to implement the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces
(CJTF), which is intended to allow “coalitions of the willing” to draw upon
NATO headquarters and other military assets in order to engage in nondefense
actions, as long as no member expresses an objection to them.
In contrast to the OSCE, NATO’s organizational capabilities for nonmilitary
aspects of conflict management are much less well articulated. Nevertheless, a
substantial reservoir of such capabilities is inherent in the large International
Staff (IS) maintained by the alliance in Brussels. In particular, the NATO secre
tary-general possesses the stature and authority to serve as an effective inter
mediary, as evidenced in Macedonia in 2001.
European Union (EU)/Western European Union (WEU)

The EU and the WEU were originally distinct organizations. During the past
decade, however, they have drawn ever closer together, especially with regard
to potential activities in the area of crisis management. Consequently, it is nec
essary to consider them together for the purposes of this chapter.
Currently, the EU and WEU are the least developed of all the major European
security institutions as RCMOs. In particular, their dedicated organizational ca
pabilities and resources for engaging in conflict management activities are less
substantial than those of either the OSCE or NATO at the moment. Nevertheless,
this situation is very much in flux, as the EU has recently launched an unprece
dented effort to develop a capacity to conduct military missions in response to
international crises. In view of the EU’s success in other fields of international
cooperation, its potential to become a leading, if not the leading, regional or
ganization in the field of conflict management is considerable, although it is too
early to discern clearly how far the EU will actually proceed along this path and
the form that it will eventually take.
Like NATO, both the EU and the WEU have restricted memberships. There is
much overlap among the three organizations. Of the current fifteen EU mem
bers, eleven also belong to NATO and the other four participate in the PFP. All
ten present WEU members are in both NATO and the EU.27
At the moment, it is arguably more difficult for former Soviet bloc states to
join the EU (and, by extension, the WEU) than NATO because of the significant
economic ramifications of membership in the former. Nevertheless, beginning
in the 1990s, the WEU has sought to work as closely as possible with non
members, creating the categories of Associate Member (for European NATO
members not in the EU), Associate Partner (for states in neither NATO nor tire
EU), and Observer. Likewise, the EU has recently indicated its desire to involve
nonmembers to “the fullest possible extent” in EU-led crisis management activ
ities, although concrete arrangements have yet to be devised.28
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Neither the Treaty on European Union (TEU) nor the modified Brussels
Treaty on which the WEU is based establishes a clear geographical area of re
sponsibility. Nevertheless, the implications of recent decisions are that both or
ganizations regard a wide range of foreign, security, and defense policy activi
ties beyond the territory of their members as falling within their competence.
Within this broad mandate, what specific types of conflict management ac
tivities are envisioned? The original Brussels Treaty of 1948 was concerned with
the defense of its signatories against attack, but this function was assumed by
NATO in the mid-1950s. In 1987, however, WEU leaders called for concerted
policies toward crises outside of Europe, paving the way for the dispatch of a
small WEU naval contingent to the Persian Gulf. And in 1992, they articulated a
detailed set of military actions, collectively known as the “Petersberg tasks,” for
which their forces might be used: humanitarian and rescue missions, peace
keeping operations, and the use of combat forces in crisis management, in
cluding peacemaking.29 The following month, the WEU approved the deploy
ment of a naval task force to the Adriatic to monitor the UN arms embargo
against former Yugoslavia.
Although its origins date back to the 1950s, the EU did not acquire broad
competence in the area of security and defense, as part of a common foreign
and security policy, until the formulation and ratification of the TEU (commonly
known as the Maastricht Treaty) in the early 1990s. Further amendments, con
tained in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, explicitly identified the Petersberg tasks
as part of the EU mandate in this area, setting the stage for a process whereby
the EU will assume all WEU functions except that of collective defense. More
recently, the European Council, the EU’s highest-level decision-making body,
has frequently emphasized the importance of the EU’s tasks in the field of con
flict prevention and crisis management. In fact, the EU has already been very
active since the early 1990s in attempting to resolve regional political conflicts,
prevent their escalation, and stabilize and reconstruct war-torn areas.
As with NATO, WEU decisions are made on the basis of consensus. Whether
consensus is any easier (because of its smaller membership) or difficult (be
cause of the lack of a dominant power) to achieve in the WEU than in NATO
on weighty issues is difficult to ascertain, given that the WEU has been used rel
atively infrequently and in much more limited ways.
The situation in the EU is more complicated. Initially, the TEU required that
substantive decisions regarding the common foreign and security policy be
made unanimously, except where it had been previously agreed to act on the
basis of a qualified majority. The Amsterdam Treaty, however, established a
more differentiated process. In principle, the Council would act unanimously
when making decisions. However, one or more members could abstain with
out preventing the adoption of a decision by the others.
Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the option of “qualified absten
tion,” involving a formal declaration, whereby the abstaining party would not be
obliged to apply the decision even as it accepted that the decision committed the
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EU as a whole. Only if the members qualifying their abstention represented
more than one third of the weighted votes would a decision not be adopted.
Nevertheless, a single country could still block the adoption of a decision by ex
plicitly opposing it, and this novel procedure does not apply to decisions having
military or defense implications.
More recently, the EU has created new political and military bodies within the
European Council to facilitate effective and timely decision making during the
conduct of military crisis management operations. A standing Political and Se
curity Committee (PSC) consisting of national representatives will exercise, un
der the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of
such operations. In addition, a Military Committee (MC) has been established to
provide military advice and make recommendations to the PSC.
The principal limitations of the EU and WEU with regard to their potential use
for conflict management lie in the area of organizational capabilities and re
sources. Thus far, the EU has relied primarily on the European Commission, its
executive organ, to support nonmilitary crisis management activities. Given its
size and resources, the Commission has a great capacity to coordinate diplo
matic efforts, observer missions, economic assistance, sanctions, and other
measures. Nevertheless, the EU has created few dedicated assets to implement
its decisions, and these have tended to be ad hoc bodies with country-specific
mandates, such as the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) in the
former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Task Force, and the European Agency for Re
construction.30
This situation may see significant change in the near future, however. The EU
presidency concluded its work in 1999 with a call for the development of a
“rapid reaction capability in the field of crisis management using nonmilitary
means.” Among the elements envisioned for such a capability were an inven
tory of relevant national and collective personnel, material, and financial re
sources, a coordinating mechanism within the Secretariat of the Council of Min
isters, and rapid financing mechanisms, such as a Rapid Reaction Fund.31 In
addition, the recently created office of High Representative for the EU in the
area of foreign and security policy provides a potentially useful focal point for
preventive diplomacy and crisis management activities.32
On the military side, the primary crisis management capabilities have resided
until recently in the WEU, which established a small planning cell (subse
quently renamed the Military Staff) and a satellite data interpretation center in
the early to mid-1990s. Nevertheless, the WEU possesses no forces or perma
nent command structures of its own and relies instead on NATO or individual
countries to provide them on a case-by-case basis.
The organizational resources of the EU have been even more limited. It was
not until 1999 that the EU made it a priority to acquire a capacity for autonomous
action, including the launching and conduct of EU-led military missions, in re
sponse to international crises. Particular importance was assigned to the rein
forcement of EU capabilities in the fields of intelligence, strategic transport, and
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command and control. In addition, the EU agreed to create a new Military Staff
within the Council that would provide military expertise and support, and per
form early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for Petersberg
tasks. The ultimate goal is to be able to deploy within sixty days and sustain for
at least one year military forces of up to fifty to sixty thousand persons.
The principal challenge facing the EU in the development of such a capacity
is the expressed need to do so “without unnecessary duplication” of NATO as
sets. Consequently, emphasis has been placed on developing more effective
European military capabilities on the basis of existing “national, binational, and
multinational capabilities.” The presence of this constraint suggests that the EU
will continue to rely heavily on the use of NATO resources and capabilities,
should they be available, to mount operations of any significant size for the
foreseeable future.
Other Regional Conflict Management Bodies
This survey does not exhaust the list of bodies that have made a contribution
to conflict management in the region or could do so in the future. One of these
is the Contact Group, which has been used to good effect in Bosnia.33 In fact,
the Contact Group is not a formal organization but rather an informal mecha
nism for coordinating the policy of a handful of major powers: the United
States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy. As such, it might be viewed
as an emergent regional security council, although it has thus far confined itself
to addressing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
This arrangement results in both significant advantages and limitations in
comparison with other RCMOs. On the one hand, the small size of its member
ship, the lack of formal procedures, and the possibility of secrecy may facilitate
the reaching of agreements in a timely manner, while the identity of its mem
bers ensures that any agreements will be backed by significant national re
sources. On the other hand, the exclusion of other countries may generate hard
feelings and cast doubt on the broader legitimacy of any agreed actions, at least
until they are considered in other organizational fora. In addition, the Contact
Group possesses no capabilities of its own. Consequently, it seems likely that it
will be used only sporadically and as a complement to other organizations.
Europe also features several subregional security organizations, the most im
portant of which is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS
was hastily established at the end of 1991 as part of the process by which the
USSR was dissolved. Originally consisting of eleven of the fifteen former Soviet
republics,34 it was initially given only a very limited organizational structure and
no formal authority in the area of security, reflecting the reluctance of most of
its members to create any powerful institutions that could threaten their new
found sovereignty. The highly restricted institutional design was supplemented
in 1993 by a Charter that provided for policy coordination and joint consulta
tion in security and defense policy and created a council of foreign ministers

Regional Conflict Management in Europe

259

and a council of defense ministers. It also established a High Command of the
United Armed Forces that could exercise control over groups of military ob
servers and collective peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, only seven of the
eleven original members signed the Charter, greatly limiting its potential appli
cation.35 In fact, the CIS has been employed for the purpose of conflict man
agement only once so far, and then only to give international legitimacy to a
Russian peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. As Neil MacFarlane concludes,
“to the extent that [the CIS] serves any purpose, it is as an instrument of Russian
foreign policy in the former Soviet space.”36

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Before assessing the adequacy of these bodies for regional crisis management,
it is necessary to consider the role of the United Nations (UN). Not only is the
UN the principal extraregional institution of relevance, but it is also the main ve
hicle for involvement by potentially interested nonregional powers, notably
China by virtue of its status as a permanent member of the Security Council.
During the Cold War, the UN was rarely called upon to promote security in Eu
rope. That task fell almost exclusively to the opposing alliance systems and,
later, the CSCE. Since 1990, however, the global body has been pressed into ser
vice on numerous occasions as a substitute for or complement to regional or
ganizations attempting to deal with conflicts on the continent.
There is no need to review the UN’s membership and geographical area of
responsibility, functional mandate, decision-making procedures, and organiza
tional capabilities and resources, all of which are well known. For the purposes
of this chapter, it will suffice to describe the ways it has been used in Europe
during the past decade. These uses fall into four broad categories, reflecting the
organization’s comprehensive authority.
First, in areas characterized by active hostilities, the UN—or, more accurately,
the Security Council—has been the principal author of international sanctions
on combatants, most notably in the former Yugoslavia. There, it has variously
established an arms embargo, a comprehensive trade embargo, a no-fly zone,
safe areas, and heavy weapons exclusion zones. Where the deployment and
use of military forces has been deemed necessary to enforce these sanctions,
the Security Council has provided mandates to NATO and other regional or
ganizations.
Second, the UN has sponsored peacekeeping operations, preventive military
deployments, and observer missions intended to prevent the outbreak or a re
newal of hostilities in areas characterized by high levels of tension. In some
cases, such as Croatia and Macedonia, these activities have been carried out by
traditional “blue helmet” forces. In Bosnia and Kosovo, however, where the
military requirements of the mission were expected to be high, the UN has
turned responsibility for implementation over to NATO.
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Third, the UN has played an important role in postconflict political and eco
nomic rehabilitation. In Kosovo, for example, the UN has assumed overall au
thority as well as day-to-day responsibility for the civilian administration of that
war-torn province. Finally, at various stages in several conflicts, the UN has
used diplomacy to prevent the escalation of violence and to assist with the
search for peaceful solutions.

EVALUATION: THE PROSPECTS FOR
SUCCESSFUL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
This survey finds that Europe possesses an abundance of institutional capabili
ties for collective conflict management, many of which reside in three sets of or
ganizations: the OSCE, NATO, and the EU/WEU. Moreover, these capabilities
are quite diverse in nature, corresponding to the full range of potentially desir
able crisis management activities identified above (table 8.4). Thus, on paper at
least, the overall potential for successful conflict management in Europe seems
quite high.
Two additional observations lend further credence to this general conclu
sion. The first is that these capabilities are not simply the result of abstract spec
ulation about what might be desirable. Rather, they have been developed
largely in response to the need to address specific recent conflicts in the region,
suggesting their relevance to likely future conflicts as well. The second and re
lated observation is that many of these capabilities have been tested in a num
ber of conflict situations during the past decade, to increasingly (although not
always) good effect.
The 1990s witnessed multiple cycles in which regional conflicts elicited the
development of new organizational capabilities, which were then employed
and, where necessary, modified to increase their effectiveness. Through such a
process, for example, the ability of the OSCE to plan, deploy, and support long
term missions has been greatly enhanced. Likewise, NATO, in response to ex
ternal pressures, has made the transition in but a decade from a military organi
zation designed only for deterrence and defense to one that can mount
collective enforcement and peacekeeping operations of unprecedented size and
intensity. In fact, NATO has supplanted the UN as the principal source of peace
keeping forces in the region. Although the EU has evolved perhaps the most
slowly of the major regional organizations, it has departed the furthest from its
original purposes, as witnessed by its recent efforts to develop a military capa
bility of its own and to promote stability in Southeastern Europe. And one body,
the Contact Group, owes its very existence to post-Cold War regional conflicts,
although the limits of its usefulness were also made clear by the deep divisions
among its members that arose over the handling of the Kosovo crisis.
To be sure, one can point to numerous instances in which one or more Eu
ropean RCMOs proved ineffective or inadequate for the conflict management
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task at hand. Indeed, there has probably been no occasion on which a regional
organization has performed flawlessly or achieved all of the goals set for it. The
more important point, however, is that these CCM capabilities have evolved
considerably over time largely in response to their perceived shortcomings and
failures. Consequently, the past performance of European RCMOs provides lit
tle basis for assessing the future prospects for successful conflict management,
although the overall trend—from the EU’s unsuccessful diplomacy as Yu
goslavia dissolved in 1991 to NATO’s forceful intervention in Kosovo at the end
of the decade—seems positive.
Within the Former Soviet Union
Nevertheless, the availability and potential effectiveness of these CCM capa
bilities varies considerably depending on the location of the conflict (see table
8.5). The prospects for successful CCM are dimmest within the FSU, where the
involvement of RCMOs is highly dependent upon the approval of Russia. As a
result, NATO and the EU/WEU are unlikely to be called upon to address con
flict in the region because of Russian mistrust of the Western powers that dom
inate them. And even though the mandate of the OSCE extends throughout Eu
rope, the nature and degree of that organization’s involvement in the FSU also
remains hostage to Russian policy.
As a general rule, Russia will probably prefer to act alone, or at least without
external constraints, within the former Soviet space and especially on its own
Table 8.5.
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territory. Russia acted on its own initiative to address the conflicts in Georgia
and Moldova, eventually sending forces to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
(The latter deployment was later authorized as a regional peacekeeping opera
tion by the CIS, although it continued to be manned and financed exclusively
by Russia.)37 And in Chechnya, it has strongly resisted even the most limited
proposals by the OSCE and the Council of Europe to dispatch small numbers of
observers. To make matters worse, Russia may sometimes have an interest in
exploiting ethnic divisions in the former Soviet republics in order to enhance its
influence in those states.
In some cases, Russia may be willing to allow the involvement of the OSCE
and the UN where doing so appears to advance its own interests. In the Baltics,
the OSCE proved useful in ensuring that the interests of Russian minorities were
protected. And Russia was able to secure the approval of the UN Security Coun
cil for the peacekeeping force that it had already deployed in Abkhazia, thereby
legitimating its actions, although it was unsuccessful in obtaining external fi
nancing for the operation.
Russia’s relationship with these organizations has not been entirely one
sided, however. In several ways, OSCE involvement in the Baltic worked in fa
vor of Estonia and Lithuania, and the resolution of the conflicts there will cer
tainly reduce Russia’s influence in the long term.38 In return for UN and OSCE
support in Georgia, moreover, Russia has been required to make accommoda
tions that in turn have limited its freedom of action. International observers in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have increased the level of transparency and to
some extent acculturated Russian forces to international norms regarding
peacekeeping.39
Outside the Former Soviet Union

In contrast, the prospects for successful conflict management in areas lying
outside the FSU are relatively bright. There, the full range of CCM capabilities
has been employed and is likely to be available for use in the future. Rather
than an insufficiency of capabilities, a principal challenge is posed by their dis
persal among multiple organizations. No single RCMO can perform all the con
flict management activities that might be desirable in a given instance. Each suf
fers from important limitations in terms of geographical area of responsibility,
functional mandate, and organizational capabilities and resources.
This decentralization can result in several different types of problems. First,
the existence of multiple organizations may encourage buck-passing, as oc
curred to some extent in the early stages of the fighting in the former Yu
goslavia. At that time, NATO stood on the sidelines while the EU demonstrated
the then very limited nature of abilities in the field of conflict management. Sec
ond, it creates the potential for interorganizational conflict and the wasteful du
plication of assets. Certainly, the initial deployment of separate NATO and WEU
naval task forces in the Adriatic to monitor the UN embargo on the former Yu
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goslavia did not represent the most efficient use of member states’ military re
sources. So far, however, serious problems of this nature have been avoided, al
though such concerns underlie many of the disagreements over the desirability
and feasibility of an EU military force, given the existence of NATO. Thus at
least as important as augmenting the conflict management capacity of European
RCMOs is the need to ensure that their existing capabilities are well used
through careful coordination both during and between crises.
At the same time, it is important to recognize the advantages afforded by this
decentralization and perhaps even some organizational redundancy. It broad
ens the range of options available to decision makers, providing them with fall
backs should an initial approach prove ineffective. Likewise, it enables inter
ested outside parties to bring multiple pressures to bear on conflict situations,
as exemplified by the simultaneous NATO and EU diplomatic initiatives in
Macedonia in 2001. Alternatively, decentralization may allow for effective task
specialization and thus a politically wise distribution of the burdens of conflict
management, as long as adequate coordination is attained. Indeed, the func
tions and capabilities of the OSCE, NATO, and EU might be viewed as increas
ingly complementary. Certainly, all three of these RCMOs in partnership with
the UN have been able to accomplish more working side by side in Kosovo
than any one of them might have achieved alone.
A further caveat follows from the enduring dependence of RCMOs on the
UN, especially the need for approval by the UN Security Council for the under
taking of coercive sanctions, peacekeeping, and other military actions. With the
partial exception of the OSCE, which could, in principle, mount peacekeeping
operations without reference to the global body, the security organizations in
Europe lack the authority to engage in coercive or forceful activities on their
own. Consequently, military actions without a UN mandate will lack legitimacy
and, as a result, may want for domestic as well as international support.
To be sure, the recent case of Kosovo, where NATO forces engaged in a
large-scale bombing campaign against Serbia over the objections of two per
manent members of the Security Council, would seem to contradict this asser
tion. Nevertheless, Kosovo is much more an exception to the rule than an indi
cation of likely future trends. This aberration was only made possible by an
unusual set of circumstances, particularly Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s
long history of using violence and flouting international efforts to promote
peace in the Balkans. Also noteworthy are the limited aims pursued by the
NATO allies, which never denied Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, and the
leading UN role in subsequent efforts to restore order in the province. In gen
eral, NATO members remain unlikely to take forceful action without the prior
approval of the UN.
Notwithstanding such constraints, the most striking feature of the current sit
uation in Europe outside the FSU is the relative abundance of organizational ca
pabilities for CCM in comparison with the potential need to employ them. Even
as these capabilities were being built up during the 1990s, a number of regional
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conflicts were being defused and even resolved. Military conflict within and
among the states of Central Eastern Europe now seems no more plausible than
in Western Europe, and even parts of the former Yugoslavia—Slovenia and per
haps now Croatia—have become highly stable. As a result, few political con
flicts with a significant potential for violence remain outside of the FSU and the
Balkans, and in almost every part of the Balkans, the major RCMOs are already
heavily involved in activities ranging from the suppression of violence to post
conflict rehabilitation.
The Future Importance of Transformational Processes
In view of this situation, one might be tempted to venture that, again with the
exception of conflicts in the FSU, the main European RCMOs are in the process
of putting themselves out of business. Such a conclusion would betray, however,
an inappropriately narrow conception of conflict management. There is still
much work to be done, but it is not the type of work, such as air strikes and ag
gressive peacekeeping, that makes headlines. Rather, the focus will be on trans
forming potential sites of conflict into stable, prosperous democracies where in
ternal and international differences are consistently addressed through peaceful
means. The ultimate goal would be to convert the entire region into a zone of
peace in which militarized political conflict is impossible or unimaginable.
Each of the major RCMOs discussed in this chapter has already played a role
in this transformational process and can continue to do so. In the case of the
OSCE, focal points for such activities are the HCNM and the ODIHR. The man
date of the HCNM describes the position as “an instrument of conflict prevention
at the earliest possible stage.” As noted above, the High Commissioner’s role is
to identify and to seek the early resolution of ethnic tensions. Although the
HCNM is not intended to act as an advocate for national minorities, the HCNM’s
recommendations to states often concern the adoption of measures to ensure
adequate protection of the rights of persons belonging to minority groups.40
The ODIHR, founded in 1990 as the Office for Free Elections, works to trans
form member states in three principal ways. It promotes democratic elections,
particularly by monitoring election processes. It provides practical support, such
as training programs, technical assistance, education projects, and the dissemina
tion of information, for the consolidation of democratic institutions and human
rights and the strengthening of civil society and the rule of law. And it monitors
the compliance of member states with their human rights commitments.41
The transformational potentials of NATO and the EU are probably even
greater. NATO already works to incorporate potential sites of conflict in Europe
into the western zone of peace through two principal, related mechanisms. The
first of these is the PFP, which from the beginning has had an explicitly trans
formational agenda. A central purpose of the PFP has been to promote the com
mitment to democratic principles. In particular, non-NATO participants pledge
themselves to work toward democratic control of their armed forces and trans
parency in national defense planning and budgeting.42
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The NATO enlargement process has taken these objectives a step further. The
1995 “Study on NATO Enlargement” set forth the following transformational ra
tionales: encouraging and supporting democratic reforms; promoting goodneighborly relations; increasing transparency in defense planning and military
budgets; and reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in
Europe based on shared democratic values. NATO has resisted establishing ex
plicit criteria for membership. Nevertheless, successful applicants almost cer
tainly have to be stable democracies. In addition, the prospect of membership
provides aspirants with a powerful incentive to resolve conflicts with their
neighbors, as exemplified by the successful conclusion of an agreement in 1996
between Hungary and Romania regarding the Hungarian minority in Transyl
vania after years of bickering.43Although some have questioned whether NATO
has in fact done anything to advance democratization,44 membership in the al
liance seems certain to lock in the important democratic gains that have been
made in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.
In the long term, however, it may be the EU that does the most to eliminate
the potential for military conflict in Europe. The EU disposes of unmatched ma
terial resources that can be used to promote economic development, internal
reform, and external reconciliation in potential or actual trouble spots. A lead
ing example of such an effort is the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process,
which offers substantial economic, financial, and technical assistance to five
Balkan states in return for their compliance with a variety of conditions regard
ing political and economic development and regional cooperation.45
Additional resources are being devoted to preparing twelve candidate coun
tries for membership. Although these states are already characterized by stable
democratic institutions, substantial progress toward the establishment of market
economies, and relatively good human rights records, the process of preparing
for EU membership entails undertaking internal changes that go far beyond
those required by NATO. Once admitted, moreover, new members will find
themselves enmeshed in a set of institutional relationships, involving the sacri
fice of some national sovereignty, that largely precludes the possibility of and
eliminates the utility of resorting to political violence. A further advantage of the
EU is that it is not encumbered like NATO by the baggage of the Cold War, al
lowing it to include among its current candidate members Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, all former Soviet republics.
Thus, it seems quite plausible that, within a decade or two, the zone of
peace will have expanded to include most of Europe outside of the FSU and
even the Baltic states. Most if not all of these states either will be full members
of the EU and NATO or will enjoy very close ties with both organizations. With
the exception of the remaining areas of the FSU, traditional conflict manage
ment activities—early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and so
on—will have been rendered largely irrelevant. It can also be reasonably
hoped that substantial and growing ties between the inhabitants of this region
and their eastern neighbors, especially Russia and Ukraine, will exert pacify
ing and stabilizing effects on the latter.
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Perhaps the biggest remaining question is whether the members of NATO
and the EU will have the political will to see this transformational process
through to a desirable conclusion. The costs of EU enlargement, while proba
bly manageable, have nevertheless engendered stiff political opposition from
many of the domestic actors who stand to lose. The NATO deployments in
Bosnia and Kosovo have frequently been criticized for their open-ended nature
and the lack of any well-defined exit strategies. And the new Bush administra
tion took office in 2001 having talked in the presidential campaign about es
tablishing a new “division of labor” within NATO, whereby the United States
would no longer participate in Balkan peacekeeping operations, a move that
many observers feared would prevent the West from achieving its goals in the
region and could even pose a serious threat to the alliance itself.46
One should not exaggerate the obstacles, however. Despite the criticism di
rected at the NATO deployments in the Balkans, they have proven remarkably
enduring. Certainly, the experience of Bosnia, where alliance forces have been
stationed for more than half a decade, suggests that it may be possible to sus
tain such missions for an extended period of time. And it did not take long for
President Bush to affirm the continuing importance of full U.S. participation.47
Finally, although enlargement of the EU to include states from the former So
viet bloc is not yet a certainty, the organization took the final steps in the
process of preparing itself for the acceptance of new members with the ap
proval of Treaty of Nice in late 2000. The completion of the current negotiations
on accession now seems to be just a matter of time.
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